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This paper presents an account of akrasia, drawn from the work of 
William James, that sees akrasia as neither a rational failing (as 
with most philosophical accounts) nor a moral failing (as with 
early Christian accounts), but rather a necessary by-product of our 
status as biological beings. By examining James’s related accounts 
of motivation and action, I argue that akratic actions occur when an 
agent attempts to act against her settled habits, but fails to do so. 
This makes akrasia a product of the agent’s practical failure to 
adequately structured her environment to bring about her desired 
action. Akratic action performs the vital function of revealing to 
the agent the exact point at which her cognitive effort was 
insufficient for bringing about her intended action. It also reveals 
that future improvement is within her control. As such, akratic 
action is the very foundation of James’s meliorism. 
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he relationship between thought and action is central to 
our understanding of what it means to be human. We 
often pride ourselves on our seemingly distinctive 
ability to act for reasons, as opposed to primarily out of 
instinct or to satisfy biological needs. Despite this ability, we often 
fail to act in accordance with what we take to be our reasons for 
acting—sometimes mere moments after deciding to act in a certain 
way. Such actions are referred to as akratic and are an important 
part of our conception of the relationship between thought and 
action. A complete understanding of action requires not only an 
account of how reasons motivate action, but also how and why that 
motivation breaks down. 
In this paper, I will present an account of akratic action drawn 
from the work of William James that is grounded in our neurology 
and evolutionary history. By making akratic action a consequence 
of our embodiment, this account avoids making judgments about 
an akratic actor’s rationality, as is the case with most contemporary 
philosophical accounts, or about the actor’s character, as is the case 
with the account found in early Christian writings. Instead, James’s 
work reorients the debate away from focusing on individual 
reason/intention-action pairings to the practical life of an agent 
over time. This affords a crucial place for akratic action in the 
practical life of agents in a melioristic understanding of human 
development. 
This paper will proceed in the following manner. First, I shall 
provide a brief overview of the problem of akrasia in the 
philosophical and early Christian traditions. Second, I shall 
examine James’s account of motivation and articulate the standard 
case for reasons/intentions motivating action. Third, I will use this 
standard case to draw out the defective case. I will then consider 
how James’s account fits within the tradition and what 
consequences this has for our understanding of James’s work, 
especially with respect to his meliorism. 
 
 
T 
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A BRIEF HISTORY OF AKRASIA 
Suppose that you are presented with a choice: you can either take 
your children to the park, or you can stay home. After a brief 
consideration, you decide that the best option would be for you to 
take your children to the park. It is a nice day, they would get 
exercise, and you would get out of the house. But instead, you do 
not go to the park. For another example, consider that you have 
decided that you should refrain from eating cake—you are trying 
to lose some weight and are trying to cut back on sugar. But then, 
the next time you are offered cake, you take seconds. In both cases, 
you are acting in a way contrary to the reasoned position that you 
have held—this is referred to as akrasia, and the actions performed 
that are contrary to your better judgment are akratic actions. 
The first substantive treatment of akrasia is found in Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics. For Aristotle, akrasia signifies cases in which 
one’s passions overtake one’s reason, either after deliberation 
(propeteia or impetuosity) or in the absence of deliberation 
(astheneia or weakness).
1
 As is generally the case with Aristotle’s 
ethics, akrasia was a property of the agent rather than the action. 
The akratic agent is one who reliably succumbs to his or her 
passions instead of reason; conversely, the enkratic agent is one 
who experiences the same passions, but does not let them affect 
reasoning processes.
2
 
Contemporary accounts of akrasia focus more on reasoning 
processes than character formation; as such, akrasia is a property 
of the action and not the agent. One of the most prominent figures 
on this topic is Donald Davidson, who argues that akrasia reflects a 
breakdown in an agent’s practical rationality.3 If S has judged φ to 
be the best course of action (or intended to φ at t), and then does 
not φ at t, then S is acting irrationally. This builds on the common 
sense notion that one’s evaluative judgments ought to have special 
status with respect to causing action; namely, evaluative judgments 
ought to have motivational force that goes beyond merely the 
ability to give reasons for an action and actually bring about that 
action. For Davidson, akratic action is necessarily irrational, for it 
is performed in the absence of a sufficient reason for that act.
4
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While many have detracted from Davidson with respect to the 
cause or structure of akratic action, most agree with his diagnosis 
that it is essentially irrational behavior.
5
 Indeed, this is the through 
line of the philosophical tradition—actions must be in accord with 
reason and not succumb to passions (Aristotle) or irrationality 
(Davidson).
6
  
An account of akrasia can also be found in the early Christian 
writings of Paul and Augustine. This account shares a great deal 
with Aristotle’s account but differs in some interesting and 
provocative ways. As it is rarely given attention in contemporary 
philosophy outside of certain circles, I will give a brief description 
of that account. 
As it is with Aristotle, akratic action is rooted in a conflict 
between different parts of the self. For the early Christian writers, 
this is the conflict between the spirit and the flesh. In his letter to 
the Romans, Paul writes:  
 
I do not understand my own actions. For I do not do 
what I want, but I do the very thing I hate. For I 
know that nothing good dwells within me, that is, in 
my flesh. I can will what is right, but I cannot do it. 
For I delight in the law of God, in my inmost self, 
but I see in my members another law at war with 
the law of my mind and making me captive to the 
law of sin which dwells in my members. Wretched 
man that I am! Who will deliver me from this body 
of death?
7
 
 
In a similar vein, Augustine writes,  
 
I was aligned with both [the spirit and the flesh], but 
more with the desires I approved in myself than 
those I frowned upon, for in these latter I was not 
really the agent, since for the most part I was 
enduring them against my will rather than acting 
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freely. . . . And who has any right to object, when 
just punishment catches up with a sinner?
8
  
 
As with Paul, Augustine laments that he is torn in conflicting 
directions and is unable to follow through with his desires, which 
he views with shame.
9
 Other passages reinforce the nature of 
akratic action for these writers. 
Unlike with Aristotle, it is not a matter of mastery over your 
passions or body; indeed, such a mastery is impossible. It is rather 
the case, especially for Paul, about what has mastery over you. 
You can judge φ to be a preferable action to ψ, but fail to φ (and 
indeed, end up ψ-ing) due to your status as a fallen creature. For 
this account, akrasia is not a matter of keeping your passions 
subordinate to reason, nor is it a matter of having the appropriate 
causal relationship between your evaluative judgments and your 
subsequent actions. Akratic action is an intractable element of the 
Christian experience; it is a consequence of the Fall and the 
corrupting effect it had on human nature. So long as one is 
attempting to act contrary to the corrupted longings of human 
nature, one will struggle. Paul and Augustine frame this in terms of 
their “innermost spirit,” or what they consider to truly reflect who 
they want to be. They identify with their desires to lead a godly 
life, but their corporal bodies bar them from doing so. This 
reinforces the importance of the fact that mastery is impossible. In 
the early Christian narrative, akrasia is only overcome through 
death.  
There are thus two main lines of thought when considering 
akrasia and akratic action. Philosophers have long thought that 
akrasia was a rational failing, in which either one’s passions 
overtook one’s rational processes, or where one’s evaluative 
judgments failed to have sufficient motivational force on one’s 
subsequent actions. In contrast, Paul and Augustine see akrasia as a 
moral failing that is the result of the Fall, whereby one’s flesh 
seeks to thwart the Christian’s desire to act in a God-pleasing 
manner. Despite its long history as a subject of philosophical 
interest, James himself had little to say about the subject of akrasia. 
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This is especially surprising given how it was also a topic in his 
home discipline of psychology. Yet throughout James’s corpus, 
references to akrasia or weakness of will are virtually non-existent. 
In what follows, I will piece together an account of akratic action 
based on James’s work. I will argue that such a view sits between 
the philosophical and early Christian accounts of akrasia, although 
it is ultimately closer to the latter than the former. This view 
accepts the general picture of the struggle offered by early 
Christians but replaces the metaphysical idea of “sinful flesh” with 
a physiological understanding of settled habits. I now turn to an 
account of James’s theory of motivation to set the foundation for 
this argument.  
 
MOTIVATION AND ACTION 
A psychologist’s theory of motivation is central to how she 
conceives of human behavior. Such a theory must perform two 
tasks: first, it must provide an account of the different kinds of 
behavior, especially between voluntary and involuntary; and, 
second, it must explain how these different kinds of behavior differ 
from and relate to each other. 
Whether James considers behavior to be voluntary or 
involuntary depends on the presence or absence, respectively, of an 
idea of how to react to a given environmental stimulus.
10
 
Involuntary behavior includes behavior such as reflexes, twitches, 
and evolved instincts.
11
 In each case, the behavior simply happens, 
without the organism having conscious input into its performance 
or where the behavior might lead.
12
 Consider the case of a twitch. 
If the twitch happens because you have had far too much espresso 
in a short period of time, there is no conscious intention to move in 
such a way prior to the muscle’s contraction. You can even twitch 
after the inevitable crash that leaves you unconscious on the couch. 
However, you are capable of twitching intentionally—perhaps to 
give the illusion of having had too much espresso, for comedic 
effect. In this case, your psychological state is significantly 
different with respect to the twitch, for you have an idea of what 
you would like to accomplish through that action. Classifying 
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involuntary behavior in this way drives James’s claim that 
instinctive actions happen only once, since you will necessarily 
have some bit of information about what the instinctive behavior 
would do after you have done it even once. 
Voluntary behavior is further subdivided into ideo-motor 
action and wilful action. In ideo-motor action, the idea of the 
action is the sufficient cause for that action, wherein “movement 
follows unhesitatingly and immediately the notion of it in the 
mind.”13 In such cases, we are “aware of nothing between the 
conception [of the movement] and the execution [of the 
movement].”14 For example, if someone wishes to open a door, 
that person reaches for the doorknob, grasps, turns, and pushes. 
Yet each step along the way is not considered in a conscious 
manner—at least not in the day-to-day lives of most people. The 
idea of opening the door is sufficient to bring that action about. In 
such cases, “incoming sensations instigate [movements] so 
immediately that it is often difficult to decide whether to call them 
reflex rather than voluntary acts.”15 Despite this difficulty, James 
insists that cases of ideo-motor action are voluntary because of the 
presence of an idea. 
Wilful behavior differs from ideo-motor behavior, for in cases 
of wilful behavior, there are multiple competing and equally 
attractive ideas of how to proceed that inhibit each other’s 
successful discharge into bodily movement. We feel that even 
though we have sufficient information to make a decision one way 
or another, there is no “imperative principle of choice between 
them,” and we are left at a loss of what to do.16 The two concepts 
may be equally as strong and equally as attractive to you, but there 
is a real sense of loss associated with the option you do not choose 
and a real sense of gain of what you do. In these cases, “both 
alternatives are steadily held in view, and in the very act of 
murdering the vanquished possibility the chooser realizes how 
much in that instant he is making himself lose.”17 These are the 
cases in which “we feel . . . as if we ourselves by our own wilful 
act inclined the beam” to act in one way over another.18 The 
distinctive feature of these situations is the feeling of effort that 
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arises due to the ideational conflict between possible courses of 
action. 
This feeling of effort is central to understanding James’s 
account of action; thus, we must understand its role and function in 
his psychophysics of action to understand how it motivates 
behavior. The feeling of effort is a by-product of our neurology 
and the effect that habituation has on the development of our 
brains over time. For James, objects of experience stimulate our 
sensory nerve-roots, which cause nervous energy to travel from 
those nerve-roots into our brains. Having made their way into the 
brain, they seek a way out, and in so doing, either “deepen old 
paths [through the brain] or to make new ones.”19 Whether there is 
a pathway in the brain will depend on whether the agent has 
experienced that object of experience or similar objects of 
experience before and how often. Each pathway corresponds to a 
series of bodily movements that result in a successful response to 
the object of experience. The more that an object is experienced, 
the deeper the pathway gets. As these pathways are used and 
reused, they become deeper and deeper, making it more and more 
likely that the behavior which results from this discharge will 
happen.
20
 Once a neural pathway is developed, the agent has 
acquired a habit.  
While habit formation occurs primarily in the brain, its ultimate 
function is to facilitate more effective interaction between the 
organism and its environment.
21
 This function is accomplished in 
two ways. First, a habituated action will have a strong degree of 
motivational force behind that action, merely by virtue of being 
habituated, regardless of the wishes of the agent at the time.
22
 
Second, a habituated action suppresses actions contrary to that 
habit.
23
 By both motivating the repetition of the habituated action 
and suppressing contrary action, the agent does not have to expend 
much cognitive effort to perform that action.
24
 In general, this 
makes a habit “the enormous fly-wheel of society, its most 
precious conservative agent.”25 It is easy and pleasant to stay 
within one’s habits, and revolution is hard and unpleasant. 
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From this characterization, we can see how a habitual action 
relates to the feeling of effort that one experiences in volitional 
action. If we act in accordance with our habits, we do not 
experience the sensation of effort that we experience when we 
have competing courses of action. Indeed, we experience effort in 
two scenarios. First, we may experience the feeling of effort if we 
try to act against a habituated response. Since habits are a strong 
motivator and are difficult to resist, any attempt to act against that 
habit will be strenuous. Second, we may experience the feeling of 
effort if we encounter an object of experience for which we have 
no habituated response. In this case, it is not that we are acting in 
the absence of any kind of response, for that would make it fall 
more into the category of instinct for James. It is considered to be 
an instinct because we would have no insight into how effective 
our response would be. Rather, we have “general forms of 
discharge” that present possible responses based on the similarity 
of the object of experience to other objects of experience.
26
 These 
general forms of discharge are themselves habits, albeit habits that 
are imperfectly suited to the object of experience in question.
27
 
Successfully resolving the situation makes it more likely that we 
activate the same neural pathway responsible for the resolution.  
Habituated actions are ideational because they originated as 
effortful behavior in which there was a clash of ideated possible 
responses to environmental stimuli. Through practice, the time 
between stimulus and response is greatly reduced, as is the amount 
of effort required to overcome competing courses of action. It is 
this anesthetizing effect of habit that places them in the center of 
considerations of akrasia. I now turn to a full explanation of what 
actions are akratic in James’s scheme. 
 
EMBODIED AKRASIA 
Akratic actions are universally considered to be defective in some 
way. The challenge is to determine the character of this defect and 
the conditions under which it makes actions akratic. To that end, 
we must now consider which types of behaviors are capable of 
being akratic in the first place.  
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All involuntary actions such as reflexes, instincts, or twitches 
can be automatically excluded because involuntary behavior is not 
preceded by an idea of how to act or based on any input from the 
agent. It is rather a direct line from environmental stimulus to 
response, with no intermediary awareness or insight into why one 
is responding in that way. Think again of the espresso-induced 
twitch—this is a result of the biochemical workings of your brain 
and is not the product of a conscious decision to act in that way. 
Since you do not intend to twitch or judge twitching to be the best 
course of action, one cannot act akratically by failing to twitch. 
James would exclude ideo-motor actions—well-formed 
habits—from consideration as well. This is due to the neurological 
basis of habits and their phenomenological character. In ideo-
motor action, an environmental stimulus prompts an idea of how to 
respond, and the mind acts unhesitatingly on that idea. There is no 
decision, judgment, or any other sort of fiat to act, but rather no 
resistance put up against the natural discharge of that idea into 
action. Since there is no judgment, intention, or awareness that 
contributes to the performance of that action, failing to perform 
that action does not indicate a breakdown of the causal force 
between reasons and action, but rather a failure of the action itself. 
For example, consider a professional baseball player’s well-
developed habit of reacting to a line drive hit towards him. His 
reaction is to dive and catch the ball. He does not weigh the 
options available to him; there is usually insufficient time for such 
processing. Failing to catch the ball does not mean that he acted 
akratically; it just means that he failed to catch the ball. 
So far, most of this is in agreement with contemporary 
accounts of akrasia. Where James starts to part ways is with his 
treatment of wilful behavior. James’s account of habit and how it 
relates to volitional action problematizes traditional thinking about 
akrasia. Any case of volitional behavior is going to involve 
multiple competing possible courses of action, all of which have a 
relatively significant degree of motivational force. Consider the 
two possible cases of volitional behavior. If you experience the 
feeling of effort when acting contrary to your settled habits, the 
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very reason why this is unpleasant and effortful is because your 
settled habits are strong motivators, and it is difficult to resist 
acting in this way, especially if this is one of the first times you 
have acted against that habit. If you experience the feeling of effort 
because you have no settled habit to respond to a particular object 
of experience, it is not as though you are acting absent any idea of 
what to do; rather, you have general patterns of behavior that are 
motivating you in competing directions towards action. Indeed, if 
you had no idea about what to do, then by James’s account, the 
response would not be voluntary. There is still a conflict (this is 
what generates the feeling of effort), and there are still competing 
sets of habits at work, but the selection is between the sets of these 
habits. Choosing one set over another will categorize that object of 
experience as being of the same kind as the objects to which those 
habits typically respond and result in the formation of a new neural 
connection. Again, there are competing courses of action, each of 
which has motivational force.  
James draws our attention to the fact that choosing one course 
of action over another does not neutralize the motivational force of 
previous contenders or otherwise add enough motivational force on 
its own to overwhelm the motivational force of those contenders.
28
 
If it did, then we would never experience the feeling of effort, 
since all our behavior would be either habit-driven or purely 
reflexive. James also recognizes that not all our motivations are 
reasons; in fact, it is impossible for us to act in a rational way, 
isolated from all other arational motivators, such as emotions, 
desires, and feelings. The strongest motivator for our future 
behavior is not our rationality, but rather how we have successfully 
responded to the environment previously—our habits gleamed 
from experience. However, we must recognize that our evaluative 
judgments (or intentions) about the best course of action ought to 
have some weight in our subsequent behavior. 
I believe that the best way to balance these two desiderata is to 
follow James in giving an agent’s tendencies, dispositions, and 
settled environmental responses a central role in his account of 
akrasia. I argue that for James, akrasia is the situation in which an 
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agent has attempted to act against his or her settled habits, but has 
failed in that attempt; the resulting action, which would always 
involve the agent falling back onto a habitual behavior, would be 
akratic. 
There are two important clarifications that must be made 
before we progress. First, it must be the case that the agent 
experienced the feeling of effort at some point in the attempt. 
Suppose that S’s habitual response to p is to φ, and that S has 
decided that she will not φ the next time she encounters p. If S 
encounters p, does not experience the feeling of effort, and 
subsequently φs, this would qualify as a case of ideo-motor action, 
which is not capable of being akratic. S may have forgotten about 
her resolution to refrain from φing; she may have not noticed that 
she had encountered p; or, maybe she immediately caved in the 
face of potential effort and resorted to φ-ing. Without the feeling of 
effort, there is no awareness of what you are doing; without 
awareness, an action cannot be akratic. 
While this makes the most sense with respect to acting against 
a settled habit, it makes less sense with respect to cases in which 
there is no settled habit. The second clarification deals with such 
cases. Suppose that S has no settled habit with respect to p, decides 
that ψ-ing is preferable to φ-ing, and then subsequently φs. In this 
case, S must have underestimated the extent to which φ was an 
established habit with respect to p-like objects of experience. The 
feeling of effort matters here, too. If S did not experience the 
feeling of effort when she failed to ψ, then φ was a settled habit 
that she was unaware was a settled habit; if she did, then she was 
attempting to act against a settled habit and underestimated just 
how settled φ was. A quirk of this account is that even if S had 
decided to φ, and then subsequently ψs, then S had underestimated 
the motivational force of ψ. With these clarifications out of the 
way, we can now consider how this account fits with previous 
accounts of akrasia. 
An interesting feature of this account is that it is closest to the 
early Christian accounts previously described more than other 
accounts, but naturalized (to an extent). James accepts the general 
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framework common to both the philosophical and religious 
accounts in that one’s cognitive processes are attempting to resist 
the motivational force generated by the body (vis-à-vis one’s 
neurology). Unlike Aristotle, but like the early Christian writers, 
James closes the door on the possibility of mastery over the body. 
So long as you are alive, you will struggle against certain 
tendencies of action and thought, and sometimes you will fail. 
James eschews characterizing the struggle as being between one’s 
flesh and one’s spirit; indeed, one’s body is just as responsible for 
enkratic actions as it is for akratic actions. Instead, one’s settled 
habits play the role of the antagonist, pulling the agent in directions 
that she would rather not be pulled.
29
 Despite making this change, 
habit’s function in the framework remains the same, and the fight 
between habituation and cognition is as intractable as the fight 
between flesh and spirit. 
One major point on which James deviates from the Saints is 
that James does not attach any negative connotations to akratic 
action with respect to one’s moral status. As noted, both Paul and 
Augustine lament their inability to conquer their bodies’ impulses 
and consider themselves less godly due to this shortcoming. 
Indeed, sin is required for akrasia to be possible in the first place. 
James, in contrast, makes no such judgment. In fact, James’s 
clearest description of these actions—which, coincidentally, 
involves a discussion of Paul and Augustine—makes no mention 
of akratic action being immoral simply for being akratic, but 
instead presents both figures as an example of those with “divided 
wills”—people who have conflicting selves that motivate 
contradictory behavior.
30
 James only reserves contempt for one 
case, the serially akratic, that will be discussed later in this paper. 
The account of akrasia given in previous paragraphs also has 
consequences for contemporary treatments of akrasia. Given 
James’s treatment of action, philosophers are wrong to consider 
akrasia a problem of rationality—although he might grant that it 
looks like one, prima facie. While we may wish that our actions 
are always guided by right reason, many—if not most—of our 
actions are motivated by things other than reasons. It is easy to 
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claim that S ought to φ, because S judges φ to be the best course of 
action. However, to claim that S is irrational if S does not φ over-
rationalizes the conditions under which decisions are typically 
made. Further, how we respond to reasons are often dictated by 
arational features of our psychology in subtle and often 
uncontrollable ways. When we may fail to act on our better 
judgments or intentions simply because we are feeling angsty, it is 
hard for James to claim that such a failure is one of rationality. 
The question is thus what kind of failure James would consider 
akrasia to be if not one of rationality or character. The clue can be 
found in the one time that James does discuss akrasia directly. In 
Principles, James eschews the then-standard terminology of weak 
wills in favor of discussing what he calls the obstructed will. The 
will—understood as a relation between an agent’s cognitive 
processes and its ideas, rather than as a discrete element of our 
psychology that can innervate bodily movements or decide courses 
of action by fiat—is obstructed when its natural tendency to 
discharge into action is impeded either through a lack of 
motivation to act (what James calls impulsion) or having an excess 
of inhibitors.
31
 Sometimes this is the result of a lack of focus due to 
fatigue, conflicting ideas, or even absentmindedness. In other 
cases, obstruction becomes pathological, where “the vision 
[attention] may be wholly unaffected, and the intellect clear, and 
yet the act either fails to follow in some other way. ‘Video Meliora 
proboque, deteriora sequor’ is the classic expression.”32 The 
“classic expression” is simply Paul’s lament: “I see the better way 
and approve it, but I follow the worse way.” In this, we see that 
James has taken the concept of akrasia out of the moral and/or 
rational spheres and made it a psychophysical matter, where the 
agent fails to act in accordance with her better judgment because 
her nervous system does not have a structure conducive to bringing 
about the actions that follow from her judgments.
33
 This is 
supported by James’s idea that akrasia is a form of lethargy, when 
motivators to act “fail to get to the will, fail to draw blood, seem, 
in so far forth, distant and unreal.”34 In these cases, it is always 
when an agent fails to overcome a physical predisposition; as per 
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James’s example, the alcoholic never talks of overcoming his 
sobriety.
35
  
From this, I argue that akratic actions are those when the agent 
fails to adequately set himself up for success at resisting his 
habitual action, making akrasia a practical failure. Consider this in 
terms of James’s recommendations in Principles for those who 
wish to alter their habits. In a striking phrase, James says that the 
overriding goal in such an endeavor is to “make our nervous 
system our ally instead of our enemy.”36 Our nervous systems can 
be our enemy because they lock us into certain patterns of behavior 
that, depending on our age and upbringing, may be impossible to 
break. James explains that a “low-born” person can never fully 
learn how to buy the right clothes or speak without a “well-to-do” 
accent, if his ascension to a higher social class happens after the 
age of twenty.
37
 After twenty, our brain has lost much of its 
plasticity and therefore cannot be reshaped as effectively as it can 
be before that time. It is, however, possible to keep oneself 
reasonably flexible through practice and incremental improvement, 
and through such exercise maintain some degree of adaptability. 
Central to this thought is the importance of manipulating one’s 
environment to maximize the chance of success for the desired 
habit to take root and to act on the new habit as frequently and 
decisively as one can.
38
 For those who have no pressing need to 
alter their habits, James has the following advice:  
 
Keep the faculty of effort alive in you by a little 
gratuitous exercise every day. That is, be 
systematically ascetic or heroic in little unnecessary 
points, do every day or two something for no other 
reason than that you would rather not do it, so that 
when the hour of dire need draws night, it may find 
you not unnerved and untrained to stand the test.
39
 
 
James states that those who do practice resisting their comfortable 
habits in this way will “stand like a tower when everything rocks 
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around him, and when his softer fellow-mortals are winnowed like 
chaff in the blast.”40 
We can see how the failure involved in akratic action is 
essentially practical: Akratic actions happen because the agent has 
not trained herself properly and/or has not manipulated her 
environment to the extent required to bring about successful 
resistance of her habituated actions. Consider the following 
example. Suppose you are binge-watching your favorite show on 
Netflix, but have a stack of papers to grade. You judge that the best 
course of action is to grade those papers and intend to do so at the 
end of the current episode. The current episode ends, and you feel 
the inner conflict—get up and grade or stay at rest and watch 
another episode. If you take the latter option, then you are acting 
akratically.  
We must keep two things in mind with respect to this example. 
First, if the action of getting up to grade feels effortful, it is 
because there is are competing ideas of how to respond to your 
current circumstances that activate contradictory physiological 
movements. In this case, you are motivated to both grade papers 
and to continue watching Netflix; contradictory physiological 
movements would include getting off your couch (to go get your 
essays) or remaining at rest. Second, performing your intended 
action is only possible if your motivation to grade is stronger than 
your motivation to watch Netflix. We should not underestimate the 
motivational force enjoyed by the act of watching Netflix in this 
scenario, even just by virtue of being your current behavior.  
Given these points, we can see how James would reject the 
idea that the central failing of akrasia is rational. Note that neither 
the act of grading nor the judgment that grading is the best course 
of action are intrinsically rational actions; they are only rational 
insofar as they are appropriate responses relative to prior 
commitments. Judging that grading papers is the best course of 
action relative to the project of exemplifying a virtuous instructor 
demonstrates that the agent is rational. It is an appropriate response 
to the agent’s environment and circumstances. For that judgment to 
immediately bring about an action, it must have sufficient 
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motivational force to overcome all competing alternatives. 
Whether a judgment to φ will have enough motivational force to 
cause φ is a consequence of the agent’s neurological structure. If 
the neural pathway responsible for φ-ing is not as deep as the 
neural pathway responsible for some other action ψ, and if φ and ψ 
are possible responses to the agent’s current circumstances, then 
the agent will not φ. In circumstances where ψ is not a possible 
response—say, if the choice were between grading and watching 
curling, the latter of which has no motivational force for the agent 
whatsoever—then the agent would have no trouble φ-ing. This is 
not a matter of rationality, but of the presence and relative strength 
of habits—a practical matter. 
The same sort of response is applicable to the idea that the 
central failing of akrasia is moral. The action that an agent takes 
will always be the one with the stronger motivational force; that is, 
the action that results from the most efficient pathway of discharge 
through the brain. In such cases, there is a strong sense in which 
the agent’s action is decided before she struggled with her 
competing motivations. In our example, the motivation to continue 
watching Netflix was too strong for you to begin your grading; 
thus, you were not capable of performing the moral action and 
cannot be faulted for not doing what you could not do. This chimes 
well with the tone of James’s treatment of the morbidly-obstructed 
will. James does not condemn those who are in such a condition 
for being immoral; rather, he recognizes that they have a 
psychophysiological problem that needs to be addressed. 
The failure involved in the grading-or-Netflix case is the 
failure to put yourself into a situation where you are more likely to 
grade papers should you decide to do so, both by training yourself 
to resist the pull of habituated actions (like watching Netflix) and 
by manipulating the environment to make your chosen action more 
likely to come about (e.g., by not beginning to watch Netflix when 
you have grading to do). Although James does not make the 
connection explicit, his maxims for developing one’s ability to 
resist habituated action clearly resemble physical exercise, such as 
resistance training. Just as we do not condemn those who do not 
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exercise in this way as irrational (relative to the project of a healthy 
life) or immoral (for failing to prepare themselves for situations in 
which physical strength is required), we would not, under James’s 
view, condemn those who do not do ‘effort training’ as being 
irrational or immoral. That said, those who engage in effort 
training will have relatively more self-awareness about their own 
tendencies and the necessary steps required to mitigate those 
tendencies. 
In sum, James’s account of akrasia does not give akratic action 
the same degree of negative connotation found in either 
philosophical or religious accounts. It merely denotes that the 
agent has not adapted her environment—and herself—sufficiently 
towards the desired end to allow for to resist her habituated 
impulse to do otherwise. While this is within the agent’s control, 
and thus is something for which she may be held responsible, it is 
also something that adds no extra irrationality or wrongness to the 
action performed that was not already present in the action. If S 
intends to not-φ, but φs, then φ is inappropriate relative to some 
overarching project regardless of whether S intended to not-φ, or 
whether S intended to φ. While akratic action may look irrational 
or immoral prima facie, it instead merely shows that the agent has 
not reached the point where she can resist her habituated behavior 
in these circumstances.  
This makes James’s account of akrasia an interesting point 
between the philosophical and religious accounts. It accepts the 
general picture found in religious accounts but rejects its 
assessment as a reflection on one’s character. It also goes further in 
showing how the disparate selves at war within one person are 
interwoven with each other and provides a physiological basis for 
that war. From the philosophical tradition, James accepts that the 
problem has something to do with one’s decision-making ability 
and the relevance of one’s project to determining what counts as 
akratic action. He rejects the view that it is ultimately a matter of 
rationality. To both, James adds a sharper focus on the arational 
factors which contribute to decision-making, including the 
environmental conditions at the time of decision. This results in 
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embodied akrasia—akratic action that is the result of a full-fledged 
agent with competing desires and intentions failing to engage with 
her environment in a way sufficient to resist her ingrained habits. 
 
AKRASIA AND MELIORISM 
The account of akrasia given in previous paragraphs fits neatly 
with James’s work in other areas and illuminates some fascinating 
connections between such works. The most important of these is 
the connection to James’s doctrine of meliorism, the belief that the 
world can be made better through human effort. In short, akratic 
action is a key component of meliorism. Akratic action provides 
the agent with valuable information that cannot be gleaned from 
anything else and acting on that information grounds the agent’s 
belief that improvement is possible through increased effort. 
If akratic action involves an agent reverting to her settled habits 
despite making the conscious effort to act against those habits, then 
there is a fair bit of awareness at play. The agent must be aware of 
her decision to make such an attempt, aware that the attempt was 
made, and aware of the attempt’s failure. Her persistent awareness 
yields information about the attempt and subsequent failure; 
namely, knowledge of the point at which the failure occurred, and 
the reason for her failure. Recall that a wilful action is brought 
about only when all the inhibitors for that action are removed.
41
 
For James, the strongest inhibitors are alternative courses of action 
that present an equal—or, quite possibly, superior—amount of 
satisfaction to the course of action that one is attempting to 
perform. Watching your favorite show, on a nice, comfortable 
couch, with some snacks, and texting your friends as they watch 
along may present itself as a more satisfying way to spend your 
night than slogging through two hundred papers comparing Locke 
and Hobbes on the state of nature.  
Yet even if you akratically watch Netflix instead of grading, 
that akratic action reveals the most important factors keeping you 
from grading. Perhaps you dread the subject matter: You can find 
new figures to study next time. Perhaps you find essays tedious: 
You can find new ways to assess a student’s grade. Perhaps it is 
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the isolation: You can find a colleague to grade alongside. Perhaps 
it is that you leave your grading to the evening: You can rearrange 
your day to grade in the morning. Regardless, trying and failing 
provides you with information that you can then take and use to 
increase the likelihood of success the next time you are faced with 
a similar situation.  
More importantly, akratic action reveals that it is not an 
external force that is keeping you from following through with 
your intentions but rather that it is an internal matter. If an action is 
akratic, then external forces are not responsible for the failure to 
act in the proper manner. If you decide to grade your papers, 
realize that you left them at the office, and therefore go back to 
watching Netflix, that action is not akratic—it was just impossible 
due to circumstances of which you were not aware. The failure of 
akratic action is always something within the agent’s control; as 
such, it is something that can be avoided and ultimately eliminated 
through effort and practice. Akratic actions thus reveal that our 
efforts can make a difference to outcomes, even if they did not 
manage to do so in that particular instance. Since this information 
is only available through akratic action, it makes akratic action a 
significant component for an optimistic outlook towards human 
development and progress. Once this optimism is extrapolated to 
society or the universe, akratic action becomes foundational for 
James’s entire project of meliorism. Akratic action shows that 
habits do not lead to action fatally, and that it is possible, through 
extra effort and determination, that an agent could always act 
otherwise—the very foundation of free will for James. Being able 
to act otherwise implies that the course of the universe is in some 
way pliable and undetermined. In short, we know that we can 
make things better in the world, because we can make things better 
with ourselves. 
Akratic action’s cognitive function and its connection to 
meliorism help explain James’s contempt for the serially akratic. 
James claims that there is “no more contemptable type of human 
character than that of the nerveless sentimentalist and dreamer, 
who spends his life in a weltering sea of sensibility and emotion, 
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but who never does a manly concrete deed.”42 This contempt is 
echoed in “The Sentiment of Rationality,” where James criticizes 
the “boor” who, through his intolerance for the feelings of unease 
associated with having unsettled beliefs about philosophical topics, 
takes the first position presented to him as absolute fact in order to 
alleviate that unease.
43
 In both cases, James criticizes those who 
make a habit out of resolving an undertaking, but then abandoning 
it at the first sign of resistance.
44
 This makes sense, given the 
practical nature of akrasia and the possibility of avoiding it through 
preparation: If one repeatedly resolves to not-φ, but then φs, then 
one is engaging in a protracted exercise in self-delusion. Trying 
and failing is only a problem if you make no attempt to use that 
information in the future to maximize the possibility of success.
45
 
This account of embodied akrasia not only invites us to think 
differently about how failure to act in accordance with our better 
judgment fits in within our understanding of practical reason, but 
also how to think of its role within our understanding of human 
progress and our ability to make the universe better through our 
collective efforts.  
 
THE PROBLEM OF JAMES’S (OUTDATED) NEUROLOGY 
While James’s account of akrasia is intriguing, the fact that it is 
based on his neurology hinders its potential to reorient debates on 
this topic. To be charitable, James’s neurology is horribly outdated. 
No contemporary figure would espouse a drainage-channel model 
of neurology. While it is beyond the scope of the present paper to 
reconcile James’s work with modern cognitive science, I believe 
that enough of a reconciliation is possible to preserve the core 
insights upon which James’s account of akrasia is based, if one 
understands James’s work functionally. To that end, I will now 
briefly turn to the work of Daniel Kahneman, whose two-tiered 
model of reasoning both resonates with James’s account of the 
struggle between habituated, easy responses on one hand and 
reasoned, difficult responses on the other. 
The clearest explanation of Kahneman’s two-tiered model of 
reasoned action is found in his 2011 work Thinking, Fast and 
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Slow. In that book, Kahneman posits that our cognitive abilities fall 
within one of two broadly-understood systems. System One is 
characterized by being quick and reflexive (“fast” thinking); 
System Two is sluggish and reflective.
46
 Being quick and 
reflexive, responses which originate in System One require very 
little effort on the part of the individual.
47
 Responses which 
originate in System Two, however, place greater demands on our 
cognitive capacities and thus require varying degrees of effort in 
proportion to the demands of the task.
48
 Since System Two is 
inherently lazy and seeks to conserve energy whenever possible, 
we often default to system one responses unless we are strongly 
invested in the outcome of the decision, or if we have no System 
One response to which we can default.
49
 
While the connection to James’s work is clear, Kahneman’s 
view rejects one key feature of James’s work: the “explosiveness” 
of the will. For James, we experience discomfort because the will 
must act and act now: not having a clear path of discharge results 
in the buildup of nervous energy. For Kahneman, System Two is 
not explosive, but lethargic, and discomfort is because burning any 
energy is unpleasant. Even with this modification, the core picture 
that James presents is maintained, including the extension to 
consciousness. According to Kahneman, control and volitional 
behavior is rooted in System Two.
50
 System Two is also what 
either endorses or rejects the intuitive responses that are provided 
by System One.  In all cases where System Two is at work, we feel 
effort as extra energy is being expended; in all cases of extra 
energy being expended, we have System Two at work. Our 
conscious life is wholly contained in the use of this energy. Indeed, 
our mental lives are wholly comprised of the instances where 
System One is insufficient or leads to disastrous results.
51
  
Again, it is impossible to fully reconcile James’s outdated 
neurology here, but it is clear that there is at least one potentially 
fruitful connection between James’s work and contemporary 
psychology, and there are likely others.
52
 If we take James’s model 
figuratively or at least functionally, then the model that he presents 
is not so far-fetched. This is especially the case given that the 
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phenomenological effects of System Two reasoning, for 
Kahneman, echo those of wilful action for James; namely, they are 
effortful and often unpleasant. Further, they are empirically 
measurable.
53
 More work must be done to explore the possibility 
of reconciling James’s work with Kahneman’s; I leave this to 
future scholarship.
54
 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The study of akrasia has a long and distinguished history. 
Although it stems from a common sense insight about how better 
judgments ought to inform behavior, one’s conception of akratic 
action is a central feature of one’s treatment of action as a whole, 
especially how one conceives of the motivational force between 
judgments and intentions on the one hand, and actions on the other. 
James’s account of akrasia and akratic action deviates from the 
traditional accounts found in both philosophy and from early 
Christian sources. James accepts the Christian view that akrasia is 
the result of conflicting motives from within, but rejects the 
framework and language of sin and redemption. James accepts the 
view of philosophy that akrasia involves some defect in the 
decision-making process, but rejects that akratic action is 
indicative of irrationality. Instead, James’s embodied view of 
akrasia holds that akratic action is the result of an agent attempting 
to act in a way contrary to one’s settled habits, but failing. This 
failure is not the result of a flaw of character or rationality; instead 
it is largely a misestimation of the effort required to act in such a 
way. This gives the agent some valuable information for how to 
avoid akratic action in the future, thus paving the way for gradual 
self-improvement. This suggests that akratic action is a key 
component for James’s doctrine of meliorism.  
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their own right. As any further consideration of this distinction 
would take us well beyond the scope of the present project, and 
that it would not affect my argument regardless of outcome, I will 
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to future trials. Second, there is a degree of repetition and 
awareness of one’s akratic behavior in James that is emphasized 
less in Aristotle. Failing to develop the ability to power through the 
feeling of effort results in someone who knowingly fails to do 
anything that might be unpleasant. Knowing that you could 
 
EMBODIED AKRASIA                                                                                          53 
 
WILLIAM JAMES STUDIES                                 VOL 14 • NO 1 • SPRING 2018 
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